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Serbia’s EU progress report: no progress for press freedom
The European Commission published its annual ‘Progress Reports’ on candidate and potential
candidate states on 10 November. In the report on Serbia, one of the issues in which no progress was
deemed to be made over the last year was media freedom. Marko Kmezić writes that discussions
over freedom of the press in Serbia have recently been raised by the country’s media itself, following
the owner of a powerful media group publicly apologising for a lack of independent reporting in a
corruption case involving the mayor of Belgrade. He argues that Serbia’s lack of media freedom
raising some fundamental questions about the country’s democracy.
On 8 November Andrija Rodić, the owner of the Adria Media Group – which publishes 18 magazines including the
daily tabloid Kurir – came out with a public apology to Serbian citizens for his role in producing overly favourable
coverage of the situation in the country, alongside 80 per cent of Serbia’s other local media owners.
Until that point he and his associated media outlets had been faithful supporters of Serbia’s Prime Minister,
Aleksandar Vučić, and his policies. In a blunt admission of the extent of political censorship in the Serbian media,
Rodić described how threats to weaken his company financially or create fabricated legal cases led to the
development of self-censorship among journalists.
While the official reason for this sudden confession is an alleged request by political decision-makers not to go public
with stories of corruption involving the Belgrade Mayor Siniša Mali, the real reasons for breaking the story probably
lay elsewhere in the ongoing scramble for money and political influence of the country’s leading media tycoons.
Nevertheless, the response from pro-government media sources, which included the publication of Rodić’s home
address, and the silence of state institutions on the matter raise some important questions about the nature of
democracy in Serbia.
Media censorship in Serbia is no longer news. Freedom House’s annual index on Freedom of the Press ranks Serbia
as 74th out of the 196 countries considered in its latest 2015 report, with the Serbian media considered only ‘partly
free’. It is interesting to observe that Serbian media freedom has, according to Freedom House, declined for six years
in a row, with setbacks registered in the legal, political and economic environment. In its previous Progress Reports,
the European Commission stated that threats and violence against journalists continue to be a significant factor
affecting the existence of self-censorship, which must be addressed during Serbia’s accession talks.
In the 2015 Progress Report on Serbia, released on 10 November, the Commission was clear in stating that while
Serbia has achieved some level of preparation concerning the right to freedom of expression, no coherent progress
has been made overall in the last year. It is worth noting that just over a year ago, Johannes Hahn, the Commissioner
for European Neighbourhood and Enlargement, stated that he needed proof, not rumours, in order to react to alleged
media freedom violations in Serbia. Over the course of the year evidence has piled up.
Freedom of the media is protected by Serbia’s constitution and legal system; however, state control and ownership of
public media, government ownership of a crucial part of the marketing sector, somewhat dubious ownership
structures, the strong economic dependence of independent media, and soft pressure coming from both political and
non-political elites, has led to the creation of a creeping form of self-censorship.
Moreover, there are journalists who continue to face physical and verbal attacks, while some live under 24-hour police
protection as they face threats due to the results of their investigative work. The economic vulnerability of
independent journalists also provides an opportunity for business interference in the media, including the influence
exercised by the representatives of foreign capital.
This has made it more difficult to clearly point to examples of political influence. Veran Matić, former director of the
B92 media organisation, has previously commented that there are numerous ways to apply pressure, and the more
sophisticated they become, the more difficult they are to recognise.
This is why the first ever testimony of an ‘insider’ in the shape of Rodić may create a turning point in understanding
the mechanisms of media control in the country. It could also open up the question of the degree to which crucial
constitutional institutions in Serbia are consolidated. If Rodić’s claims turn out to be true, or state institutions fail to
address his allegations in an impartial and transparent manner, the issue will inevitably raise questions over the level
of democratic consolidation in Serbia.
But how did we get to this point? Prime Minister Vučić’s government is not the first to develop mechanisms of media
control. It has merely perfected the practice developed by its predecessors, led by the Democratic Party under Boris
Tadić. Ultimately the main weakness in Serbia’s democracy is a legal failure: namely, the defective system for
ensuring the rule of law, which lacks checks and balances, while the prominent role of the executive branch threatens
to undermine the entire democratic system. Long term, this deficiency may even discredit attempts to hold fair
elections as part of a meaningful democratic process.
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